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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
HENRY LEE,

Case No. 920566-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution

of Utah

provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10(2) provides:
Force used in executing warrant —
prerequisite, when.

Notice of authority

When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance,
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
•• •

<2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial judge err in denying appellant's

motion to suppress in light of the changed circumstances at the
time the search warrant was executed?
Standard of review. Although Utah cases have stated that
the reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate's
determination of probable cause, those decisions refer specifically
to the magistrate's determination of probable cause and not to the
determination that a no-knock warrant is appropriate. See State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983), State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d
830,

833

(Utah App. 1991).

No deference standard has been

articulated in assessing a no-knock provision in the two lead cases
from Utah appellate courts. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah,
September 28, 1992); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988).
The dangers presented by no-knock warrants and the
requirement that "proof" be established before such warrants are
issued

suggest

that

deference

should
2

not

be

given

to

the

magistrate's decision to issue a no-knock warrant; review should be
de novo. See also Judge Orme's concurrence in State v. Weaver. 817
P.2d 830, 836 (Utah App. 1991):
Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or it does
not. No credibility issues exist; no evidence has to be
weighed. Why should not the appellate court read the
affidavit and decide for itself the conclusion to be
drawn, like it would with a written contract?

2.
States

Was the evidence seized in violation of the United

constitution

as

the

result

of

misrepresentations

or

omissions in the affidavit?
a.

Was material information omitted from the

b.

Did the officer act intentionally or with

affidavit?

a reckless disregard for the truth in omitting material
information?
c.

With the omitted material

information

added, does the affidavit establish probable cause?
Standard of Review.

After inserting material omitted

information, State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert,
denied. 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987), this
Court reviews the affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a
whole" to determine whether the magistrate had "a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed."
P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Weaver. 817

It "need not defer to the trial

court's finding" and instead makes "an independent review of the
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written

3

evidence." Id. The standard of review for any factual assessments
underlying

a determination

that probable

cause existed

is a

"clearly erroneous" standard; the conclusion that probable cause
existed is a legal conclusion, and a correction of the error
standard is applicable.

See State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 468 n.

8 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State
v. Stricklincr. No. 910621-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (Utah App. December
3, 1992).

3*

Was the search warrant invalid under Article I,

section 14 of the Utah constitution?
a.

Should the Acruilar-Spinelli test apply to

probable cause determinations under Article I, section 14
or the Utah constitution?
b.

Is the search warrant invalid as a result

of omissions and failure to satisfy the Acruilar-Spinelli
test?
Standard of review.

The issue as to the appropriate

analysis under Article I, section 14 and the determination as to
whether probable cause was established are questions of law subject
to a "correction of error" standard; factual assessments underlying
the determination are subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard.
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 468 n. 8 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1992); State v. Stricklina. No. 910621-CA
slip op. at 1-2 (Utah App. December 3, 1992).

4

When reviewing an affidavit to determine whether it
establishes probable cause as required by the Utah constitution,
this Court should not defer to the magistrate's determination;
instead, this Court should review the face of the affidavit to
determine whether it establishes probable cause.

See generally

State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835-36 (Orme, J., concurring).
The deference given a magistrate's determination under
the fourth amendment has been questioned by at least one member of
this Court:
Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or it does
not. No credibility issues exist; no evidence has to be
weighed. Why should not an appellate court read the
affidavit and decide for itself the conclusion to be
drawn, like it would with a written contract?
Id. at 836.
Rather

than

protecting

fourth

amendment

values

by

encouraging officers to draft sufficient affidavits and magistrates
to

issue

search

warrants

only

where

an

affidavit

clearly

establishes probable cause, this deference can result in searches
being upheld in borderline situations where the affidavit on its
face has failed to establish probable cause.

If the "substantial

basis" test is interpreted to uphold affidavits where probable
cause does not exist on the face of the warrant, fourth amendment
requirements will not always be met.

See Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836

(Orme, J., concurring).

4.

If the exclusionary rule is not applicable, was

there a sufficient nexus between Mr. Lee and the controlled
5

substance found in the bedroom near him to establish probable cause
to arrest him?
Standard of review.

The standard of review for any

factual assessments underlying a determination that probable cause
existed is a "clearly erroneous" standard; the conclusion that
probable cause existed is a legal conclusion, and a "correction of
error" standard is applicable. See State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460,
468 n. 8 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1992);
State v. Stricklincr, No. 910621-CA slip op. at 1-2

(Utah App.

December 3, 1992)*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an information dated December 27, 1991, the State
charged

Henry

Lee with unlawful

possession

of

a

controlled

substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a
third degree felony.

R. 10-11.

On March 17, 1992 defendant filed a motion to suppress
all evidence seized in violation of his rights under the fourth
amendment, and Article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution.

R.

27-31. Following an evidentiary hearing held on June 15, 1992, the
trial court denied the motion. R. 39-42, 57-62. Defendant entered
a conditional no contest plea pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah App. 1988), specifically reserving his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 50-6.
Defendant was sentenced to 90 days in the Salt Lake
County Jail.

R. 63-4.
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Brad Bassi swore out an affidavit for the search
of premises at 1442 South Roberta Street (240 East) , and the person
of Vera Mason.
basis.

The search warrant was issued on a

R. 93; Defendant's Exhibit 1.

,f

no-knock"

A true and correct copy of

the search warrant and affidavit is attached as Addendum A.1
Appellant Henry Lee was not named in the warrant.
The

affidavit

unidentified sources.

was

based

on

R. 100-101.

information

from

two

The first source was a probationer of

Probation Officer Harvey Van Katwyk; the second was a confidential
informant ("CI"). The affidavit states that Van Katwyk vouched for
the reliability of his probationer.

Aff. page two.

vouched for the reliability of his CI.

The affiant

Aff. page 3.

Affiant

failed to disclose in the affidavit that CI was on probation, or
that CI had at least one prior conviction for drug offenses.

R.

98-99.
In

requesting

no-knock

service,

page

four

of

the

affidavit states:
Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this
warrant. Your affiant has reviewed the criminal history
of DOWELL and he has a prior armed robbery. Further your
affiant has been told that MASON has prior arrest for
weapons and narcotic offenses.
Your affiant also knows from training and
experience that the items sought pursuant to this search
warrant are easily destroyed, hidden or altered. Further
your affiant fears any delay in the this[sic] service of
defendants Exhibit 1, consisting of nine pages, is contained
in the file in a separate manila envelope. This exhibit consists
of the search warrant (cover page, Attachment A (items to be
seized), and page two, followed by the affidavit (cover page,
Attachment A (items to be seized), and pages two through five).

7

this search warrant will allow additional quantities of
heroin and cocaine to be sold.
Officer Bassi had no information concerning recent possession or
use of weapons by Vera Mason, and no such assertion is contained in
the affidavit. R. 121. The affidavit does not indicate that Mason
had any convictions for weapons or drug offenses.

R. 120.

Officer Bassi was the supervising parole officer for the
Joe Dowell referenced in the affidavit.

Aff. page three.

At the

hearing on Mr. Lee's motion to suppress, Bassi testified as
follows:
Q.
And included in that is the allegation —
or the request that you made that you be allowed to
execute the search warrant on a no-knock basis; is that
right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And the primary reason for your request
for that was the presumed presence of an individual in
the residence named Joe Dowell; is that right?
A.
No, that's not correct.
Q.
What was the reason for which you asked
the no- knock authorization on the warrant?
A.
The possibility of weapons in the
residence.
Q.
Was there not specific reference in
connection with that to an individual named Joe Dowell?
A.
There was reference to that.
Q.
There was an indication that he had a
prior robbery arrest of some sort; is that right?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
And you, in fact, indicated in the
affidavit that you believed Joe Dowell to be a dangerous
person, is that right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
At the time of the execution of the search
warrant you knew that Joe Dowell would not be present at
the premises when you searched it; is that right?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
And that's because you had him in custody
in Adult Probation and Parole offices at the time of the
execution of the warrant; is that right?
A.
That's also right.

8

R. 94:23-96:1. Joe Dowell was not named in the warrant.

R. 100.

There is no evidence in the record as to whether Officer Bassi
intended at the time of the warrant's issuance to have Dowell under
custody before exercising the warrant.
The search warrant was executed on a no-knock basis. The
issuing magistrate was not recontacted concerning the material
change in circumstances resulting from the fact that Joe Dowell was
in custody at the time of execution.

R. 96.

Henry Lee was on the premises at the time the warrant was
executed. R. 87, 90. Lee emerged from a bedroom at the officers'
request during the search. R. 92, 104-105. Lee was handcuffed, R.
105-106, taken to the kitchen area and arrested for possession of
narcotics, although no narcotics were found on the person of Lee.
R. 109-110. Incident to his arrest, Lee was searched at the Salt
Lake County Jail and syringes were seized.

R. 113, 115-116.

The room from which Lee emerged contained needles, a
plate on the bed containing heroin cut in pieces, and other drug
paraphernalia. R. 92. Another individual was found lying directly
next to the bed, with one hand touching the bed.

R. 106.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Probable cause must exist both at the time a warrant is
issued and at the time the warrant is executed. Under the facts of
this case, there was no basis for a no-knock warrant at the time
the warrant was executed.
possible

presence

created

Joe Dowell, the individual whose
the
9

danger

necessitating

no-knock

execution, was in custody at the time the warrant was executed.
Under

the

fourth

amendment

and

under

Utah

statutory

and

constitutional law, the search warrant was invalid.
The Leon "good faith" exception cannot save the seized
evidence from the exclusionary rule.

Officer Bassi swore out the

affidavit, obtained the warrant, put Dowell in custody, and then
executed the warrant. He was fully aware at the time of execution
that there was no basis for no-knock execution.
No Leon-type good faith exception should exist under the
Utah constitution.
required.

The exclusionary rule is constitutionally

Federal analysis under the fourth amendment to the

contrary is troublesome and confusing, and should be rejected.
The affidavit was invalid under the fourth amendment due
to material

omissions.

Affiant

failed

to

disclose

that

a

confidential informant was a probationer with at least one prior
conviction on drug-related charges.

With the omitted material

information added, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause.
The affidavit was invalid under Article I, section 14 of
the Utah constitution due to material omissions. Utah should apply
the Aauilar-Spinelli test when analyzing affidavits under Article
I, section 14. The affidavit failed to adequately show the basis
of knowledge, veracity, and reliability of information received
from informants.
In all cases where the affidavit in support of a search
warrant contains material misrepresentations or omissions, there
can be no good faith execution.
10

There was no sufficient nexus to justify arrest of Mr.
Lee.

There was nothing at all to indicate that Mr. Lee had the

intent to exercise dominion and control over the narcotics seized
at the searched premises. Absent some additional factor allowing
an inference of intent, Mr. Lee's arrest was improper.
All evidence seized should be suppressed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR
EXECUTION OF A NO-KNOCK WARRANT AT THE
TIME THE WARRANT WAS EXECUTED
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10 provides:
Force used in executing warrant — Notice of authority
prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance,
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
•• •

(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
Under
precluded

from

the

fourth

unreasonable

amendment,
searches.

officers

are

Implicit

likewise
in

such

reasonableness is the understanding that excessive force will not
be utilized in executing a search warrant. "Unquestionably, notice
is ordinarily required as a prerequisite to the gaining of entry by
physical force.11 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(b) at 273 (2d
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ed. 1987) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct.
1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958)).
The

purpose

of

requiring

notice

before

entry

is

threefold:
(1) the protection of an individual's private activities
within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and
physical injury to both police and occupants which may
result from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the
prevention of property damage resulting from forced
entry.
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 701.

A.

WITH DOWELL IN CUSTODY, THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT PROOF TO JUSTIFY NOKNOCK EXECUTION.
1.

Under Fourth Amendment.

There is no dispute as to the fact that Joe Dowell was in
custody in Officer Bassi's office at the time the search warrant
was executed. Without the possibility of Dowell's presence, there
is insufficient proof to justify execution of a no-knock warrant.
Officer Bassi admitted at the suppression hearing that a no-knock
warrant was requested due to the possible presence of Joe Dowell.
Absent allegations concerning Dowell, the affidavit contains vague
references to Vera Mason and standard

recitations

concerning

destructibility of drugs.
Although Utah has not addressed the issue, probable cause
sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant must exist not
only at the time the warrant is authorized, but also at the time it
is executed.

Many federal cases have expressed a "concern that
12

probable cause may dissipate between the time of a warrant's
issuance and its execution."
(6th Cir.), cert, denied,

U.S. v. Bowling. 900 F.2d 926, 931
U.S.

, 112 L.Ed.2d 79 (1990).

See

also Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.) (requiring that
searches be conducted within ten days of warrant
Bowling

involved

issuance).

a search executed pursuant to warrant that

occurred some two hours after an unproductive consensual search.
The Sixth Circuit noted:
The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be an incomplete and highly
manipulable safeguard if a neutral magistrate could not
play the same impartial role in assessing continuing
probable cause that he plays in determining probable
cause to issue the warrant in the first place. Because
no exigent circumstances are presented by the facts of
this case, the officers should have refrained from the
second search until a neutral magistrate determined that
probable cause continued to exist. Notwithstanding the
officers' failure to do this, the fruits of the second
search are not to be suppressed if this court finds that
a neutral magistrate would have determined that probable
cause existed to conduct a second search despite prior
fruitless consent search.
Bowling, 900 F.2d at 933.

The court upheld the search, but only

because the consensual search was not as broad as the warrant
search.2
In the instant case, allegations concerning Vera Mason
are insufficient to justify issuance of a no-knock warrant. Bassi
asserts "your affiant has been told that MASON has prior arrest for
weapons and narcotics related offenses."

Aff. page four.

Bassi

does not disclose the source of this information, the recency of

2

The consensual search only lasted fifteen minutes, and no
search of the subject's car occurred.
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such alleged arrest or arrests, or whether any conviction was
obtained. There is no indication whatsoever as to the reliability
of this information.

Bassi does not indicate that he believes the

source to be reliable, or that he even believes the information
himself. This hearsay allegation, with no indication of veracity,
is insufficient proof to justify a no-knock warrant.

In State v.

Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107
S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987) the Supreme Court stated:
The use of hearsay evidence to establish
probable cause does not necessarily undercut the validity
of the warrant. If the hearsay is reliable, and there is
a substantial basis for giving it credence, it will
support the issuance of a warrant. United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-81, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2080, 29
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); accord State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d
135, 138, 514 P.2d 800, 802 (1973); State v. Treadwav, 28
Utah 2d 160, 162-3, 499 P.2d 846, 847-48 (1972).
Id. at 192. In the present case there is no basis for giving this
hearsay credence, much less a substantial basis.

Absent any

indication as to recency, allegations concerning Ms. Mason also
must be rejected as being fatally stale.

See United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904, 104 S.Ct. 3405,

, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 686

(1984); People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo. 1981)
grounds

in

an

affidavit

for

a

search

warrant

must

("The

have a

relationship to the date and time that the warrant is issued.").
Generalities

and

speculation

about

weapons

and

the

possibility of their use are not a sufficient basis to risk the
dangers posed by a no-knock warrant.

See Tatman v. State, 320 A.

2d 750, 751 (Del. 1974) ("an unsupported assertion of 'fear that
the defendant might have a weapon'" insufficiently supported a good
14

faith belief that a no-knock entry was necessary); State v,
Schmidt, 740 P.2d 351, 355 (Wash App. 1987) ("general speculation
that a defendant may be armed and police safety endangered is not
sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances excusing compliance
with the knock and announce rule. ... An informant's statement that
the defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient.11); State v. Piller,
628 P.2d 976, 979

(Ariz. App. 1981) (it was not enough that

officers knew the defendant "had negotiated for the purchase of a
.357 magnum handgun and that there was a possibility of such a
weapon being in the residence. Police knowledge of existence of a
firearm excuses compliance with announcement requirements only
where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used
against them if they proceed with the ordinary announcement, and
this belief must be based on specific facts and not on broad,
unsupported presumptions"; "the need for compliance with the knocknotice requirements is stronger where the police had knowledge of
the presence of a weapon in the house and there is nothing to
suggest that the occupants have a propensity to use the weapon
against them, because there is more danger of a deadly encounter if
the householder is startled by an unexpected intruder"); People v.
Ouellette. 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (111. 1979) (prior police knowledge
of a defendant's possession of a handgun and pistol box does not
justify a no knock search because the officer did not demonstrate
that defendant was likely to use firearms, or that he presently
unlawfully possessed them, or that he attempted to use weapons or
had threatened the police) ; People v. Bennetto. 517 P.2d 1163, 1167
15

(Cal. 1974) ("where the police are aware of such a weapon, the case
for requiring them to give notice of their authority and purpose
becomes more rather than less compelling.1') (quoting People v.
Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Cal. 1973)); State v. Pierson. 472
N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991) ("The fact that a person is a member of
a class of persons more likely to resist search is not sufficient
to justify unannounced entry. The officers must have knowledge of
specific facts that justify unannounced entry.

The officers must

have knowledge of specific facts that indicate that this particular
person will

conduct

himself

or herself

in this manner when

confronted by police.").
The affidavit alleges that "[y]our affiant also knows
from training and experience that the items sought pursuant to this
search warrant are easily destroyed, hidden, or altered." Standing
alone, this allegation is insufficient to justify a no-knock
warrant.

Police cannot support issuance of a no-knock warrant

merely by reciting that household plumbing is present and drugs are
involved.

See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 n. 3 ("more particularized

showing may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of
drugs is sought").
The affidavit plainly states "affiant was told that Vera
Mason

and Joseph

Dowell

were

selling

narcotics', from the premises."

'a large

Aff. page three.

quantity of
The search

warrant provides for search for scales, plastic bags, tape, paper
bindles, syringes, bent spoons, pipes, glassware for making crack
cocaine, residency papers, U.S. currency, and narcotic recordations
16

in addition to drugs.

This case does not present the residential

user situation of Rowe, where a small quantity of drugs for
personal consumption may be rapidly disposed of or secreted.

The

bulk of the materials sought are not easily destroyed.
Allowing no-knock warrants in any case involving drugs
results in an almost "blanket rule."

See 2 LaFave, Search and

Seizure § 4.8(d), p. 280 (1987); People v. Gastelo. 432 P.2d 706
(Cal. 1976). Universally allowing no-knock service whenever drugs
are sought goes against the dictates of the fourth amendment and
§ 77-23-10(2). See State v. Sparao. 639 P.2d 782, 784-5 (Wash App.
1982); Gastelo, 432 P.2d at 707, 708; Parsley v. SUP. Ct. , 513 P.2d
611 (Cal. 1973); State v. Bamber, 592 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. App.
2 Dist. 1991) ("we are not convinced that the existence of normal
plumbing

in one's home dispenses with the need to knock and

announce during the execution of a warrant to search for small
quantities of cocaine").
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue of whether the fourth amendment requires that
notice be given before entry, such a notice requirement did exist
at common law and can be "traced back as far as the decision in
Semayne's Case, [5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603] in 1603."
2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) at 270-1. The Supreme Court
has addressed the closely related issue of notice prior to entry
for purposes of making an arrest in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).

In Ker the officers entered

the premises without announcement by means of a pass-key.
17

The

Supreme

Court

found

the

entry

to

be

reasonable

under

the

circumstances, but only because Ker possessed narcotics which could
be quickly destroyed and because Ker had engaged
behavior just prior to his arrest.

in furtive

Id. at 40-41.

In this case, the fact situation which warranted issuance
of a no-knock warrant no longer existed at the time of execution.
Allegations

concerning

Mason

and

disposability

of

drugs are

insufficient to independently justify no-knock execution of the
warrant.
As a result of the excessive force utilized in executing
the warrant, all evidence obtained should be suppressed.

The

police misconduct implicates substantive rights under the fourth
amendment.

All evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution

is inadmissible in state court.

Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655,

81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961).

2.

Under Utah Law.

Under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2), there was no sufficient proof
to justify execution of the warrant in a no-knock manner.
All argument under § I.A.I., supra, is equally applicable
here and is incorporated by reference.

Additionally, Utah Code

Ann. § 77-23-10(2) requires "proof" before a magistrate may direct
that a warrant may be executed without prior announcement.

This

requirement of proof sets a higher standard than the probable cause
requirement under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14.
18

Even if this Court were inclined to rule that there was
probable cause for a no-knock warrant under the fourth amendment,
it should still hold that the "proof" requirement of § 77-23-10(2)
has not been met.
The proper remedy for the improper execution of the
warrant in this case is suppression.

"Where a statute establishes

procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section
77-23-5 does [nighttime execution], violation of the statute cannot
be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression
of

the

evidence

gained

appropriate remedy."
App.

1991) , rev/d

from

the

challenged

search

is

the

State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah Ct.
on other grounds,

(September 28, 1992).

196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2) similarly

involves procedures for protection of substantive rights, namely
protection
warrants.

from

use

of

excessive

force

in

executing

search

Since the police never would have come in contact with

Mr. Lee absent the improper search, all evidence seized on the
premises and from Lee's person should be suppressed.

B.

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT
APPLY IN THIS CASE.
1.

Under Federal Law.

The issue of whether an officer relied in good faith on
a warrant "is subject to de novo determination" by the appellate
court. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah, September 28, 1992)
(citing United States v. Freitas. 800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.
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1986)).

There is no basis for asserting good faith execution of

the warrant under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct.
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

The federal good faith exception

provides that where an officer acts in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant, the exclusionary
rule does not apply.

State v. Thompson 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah

1991). Officer Bassi, as affiant, detainer of Dowell, and executor
of the warrant, had knowledge at the time of execution3 that Dowell
was in custody.

As in Rowe, one officer prepared the affidavit,

secured the warrant, and executed the search.

The same result,

suppression, should pertain here.4
Additionally, there can be no good faith where a search
warrant was obtained through the bad faith of officers. A warrant
premised on an affidavit containing material misrepresentations or
omissions cannot be executed in good faith.

"When the magistrate

reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant is not
presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the
warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers."

Rowe, 806

P.2d at 737 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 915).

3

There is no evidence in the record, but the possibility
exists that at the time of obtaining the warrant, Bassi intended to
detain Dowell prior to execution of the warrant. This is precisely
the type of police misconduct that should be sanctioned by
application of the exclusionary rule. See State v. Buck, 756 P.2d
700, 703 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
4

Rowe was overturned because the execution of an arrest
warrant provided the police with an independent justification for
no-knock nighttime entry. Such independent justification is absent
here.
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2.

Under Utah Law.

Utah has not yet addressed whether the good

faith

exception is applicable to Article I section 14 of the Utah
constitution.

Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420 and n. 4.

In footnote 8

in Rowe, this Court noted:
To date, neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court
has held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception
would apply in the context of Utah's exclusionary rule.
Many state courts have determined that exclusionary rules
existing by virtue of state constitutional provisions are
not subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception. See,
e.g.. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 68
(1990); People v. Sundlincr, 153 Mich.App. 277, 395 N.W.2d
308, 315 (1986), appeal denied, 428 Mich. 887 (1987);
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988);
State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857
(1987); People v. Biaelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d
630, 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (1985).
806 P.2d at 737 n. 8.
An

"appendix"

to

Rowe

traces

the

history

of

the

exclusionary rule and the Leon "good faith" exception, concluding:
As and when the appellate courts of this state
are squarely confronted with the question of whether the
exclusionary rule existing by virtue of Article I,
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is subject to a
Leon-type "good faith" exception, a healthy skepticism
should permeate the courts' consideration in view of the
troublesome analysis in Leon.
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 743.
In his dissent in Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-960, Justice
Brennan traced the history of the exclusionary rule and outlined
the argument for rejecting a good faith exception under the fourth
amendment.

At the outset, he pointed out that the good faith

exception is premised on the idea that the exclusionary rule is "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
21

rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right." 468 U.S. at 931, quoting Leon, 468
U.S. at 906. Justice Brennan disagreed and reiterated the position
he outlined in his dissent in United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S.
338, 355-367, 94 S.Ct
exclusionary

rule

is

613, 38 L.Ed.2d
constitutionally

561

(1974), that the

generated

rather

than

judicially created.
In State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d at 460, the Utah Supreme
Court acknowledged

Justice Brennan's dissent

in Calandra and

expressly left open the question of whether the exclusionary rule
applicable to Utah constitutional violations was a constitutional
requirement.

Given the history and importance of the rule as well

as the troubling and confusing federal analysis, this Court should
determine that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the Utah
constitution

and

is not merely

Therefore, no good

a judicially

created

remedy.

faith exception can exist under the Utah

constitution.
Even if the federal good faith exception is applicable to
Article I section

14, in this case Officer Bassi could not

reasonably rely on the warrant. He knew that the basis for the noknock warrant was the possible presence of Dowell, knew that Dowell
was in custody, and executed the warrant on a no-knock basis
anyway.
Further, there can be no good faith in any case where
there are material omissions from the search warrant affidavit.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6. The state has an interest
22

in requiring its officers to make full disclosure to magistrates
before search warrants are issued.

POINT II. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS INVALID UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS A RESULT OF
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OR OMISSIONS
THAT INVALIDATE THE FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizure.
In Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct.
2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held
that a defendant has a right to an evidentiary hearing where he or
she makes

a preliminary

intentionally

included

showing

that a false

statement was

in a search warrant affidavit, or was

included with a reckless disregard for the truth, and such false
statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause.

At such

hearing, if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the false statement was intentionally included, or
included with a reckless disregard
material must be excised

for the truth, the false

from the affidavit.

The remaining

information is reviewed for a determination as to whether it
supports a finding of probable cause.

If probable cause does not

exist without the excised material, the search warrant must be
voided and the items seized under the warrant excluded "to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
affidavit.11

Id^
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In State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985), reh'q
denied (1986), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "[f]alse
statements

in

a

probable

cause

affidavit

made

knowingly,

intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a warrant issued in
reliance thereon."

In Slowe. the officers prepared the affidavit

prior to a transaction which was part of a "sting" operation. The
transaction occurred as anticipated, and the statements in the
affidavit were, for the most part, accurate.

Although the Court

indicated that it did not condone the pre-preparation of search
warrant affidavits, it nevertheless upheld the warrant because
ff

[t]he minor discrepancies that did occur did not undermine the

essential truth of the allegations or rise to the level of
knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly making a false statement."
Id. at 111.
In State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987), the
Utah Supreme Court again followed the fourth amendment analysis in
Franks v. Delaware but extended that analysis to include material
omissions as well as material misrepresentations.
In Nielsenf the officer alleged in the affidavit that a
confidential informant ("CI") had given him certain information;
the officer also attested to the CI's reliability based on prior
transactions with the CI. At the preliminary hearing, the officer
essentially reiterated the statements in the affidavit.
190.

Id. at

After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the

affiant did not know or have contact with the CI and had received
24

the information in the affidavit from another officer who had
worked with the CI.

Id.

The Supreme Court determined that the State's contention
that the false statements were not made intentionally or with a
reckless disregard for the truth was "entirely unpersuasive." Id.
at 191.

"Analyz[ing] the affidavit for probable cause by adding

the information improperly omitted," fid, at 192 n. 2), the Court
upheld the validity of the warrant "under federal law" because
n

[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, with the omitted

information

inserted,

the

affidavit

amply

supported

the

magistrate's finding of probable cause." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192.

A.

MATERIAL INFORMATION
FROM THE AFFIDAVIT.

WAS

OMITTED

In the present case, the officer omitted the following
information:
1. that CI was on probation; and
2. that CI had at least one prior conviction
for drug offenses.
See R.

98-99.

This

information

has direct

bearing

on the

reliability of the information received from the CI.
Furthermore, this information reflects on the reliability
of the statements of Bassi himself.
affiant

has not promised

information provided.

nor paid

Bassi asserts that "Your
the CI anything

for the

Further CI has made statements against CI's

own penal interest." In handwriting, the affidavit then states "CI
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stated that he purchased narcotics at said premises.11

Aff. page

three.
Whether a probationer would voluntarily proffer to a
probation officer that he had broken the law without first being
promised something by someone.in return raises serious questions.
Such an admission of a probation violation could only serve to land
the probationer in jail. Had Officer Bassi revealed that CI was a
probationer, the magistrate would have noticed that the logical
consistency of these statements was suspect. The magistrate could
also

take

into

consideration

that

probation

officers

have

considerable power and control over probationers.
These material omissions falsely created the impression
that

information

actually was.

in the affidavit was more reliable than it

The magistrate was denied an opportunity to fully

assess whether probable cause existed.

B.

THE OFFICER ACTED INTENTIONALLY,
KNOWINGLY, OR WITH A RECKLESS
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH IN OMITTING
MATERIAL INFORMATION.

The officer in this case knew at the time he prepared the
affidavit that the CI was on probation or parole.

R. 98:23-99:4.

He also was aware that this information was not disclosed in the
affidavit.

Id.

The officer was further aware at the time he

prepared the search warrant affidavit that CI had at least one
conviction for a drug related offense.
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R. 99:5-14.

Under

these

circumstances,

the

officer

acted

intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth.

The officer knew the true facts concerning his CI.

C.

WITH
THE
OMITTED
MATERIAL
INFORMATION ADDED, THE AFFIDAVIT
DOES NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE.

Where material information is omitted from an affidavit
either intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth,
Nielsen requires that the affidavit together with the omitted
information be assessed for probable cause.

"'Probable cause7 is

a standard requiring the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable
determination whether 'there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place./M
State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct 2317, 2332, 76
L.Ed.2d 527, 548, reh'q denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77
L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983)).
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the
two pronged Aouilar-Spinelli

test5 which had previously

been

followed in evaluating a search warrant affidavit based on an
informant's

tip,

and

embraced

the broader

"totality

of the

circumstances" test:
5

The two prong test evolved from Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S.
108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Soinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The two
prongs are:
(1) the affidavit must establish the basis of the
informant's knowledge, and (2) the affidavit must establish the
informant's veracity and reliability. See discussion in § III.A.,
infra at p. 34.
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The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the "veracity"" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-9.
Utah has followed the United States Supreme Court in
embracing the more general "totality of the circumstances" test in
the fourth amendment context. See State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1983); State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App.
1989); State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v.
Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990).

Although rigid compliance

with the Acruilar-Spinelli guidelines may not be required under
Gates, compliance with those guidelines may nevertheless

"be

necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable cause." Bailey.
675 P.2d at 1205.
Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person
providing the information for the warrant may well be
necessary to establish with a "fair probability that the
evidence sought actually exists and can be found where
the informant says.
Id.
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990),
this Court stated:
Although the Acruilar-Spinelli guidelines are not to be
mechanically applied, they are useful even under the
totality of the circumstances test for determining
whether the facts establish probable cause. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that veracity,
reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant
"should be understood simply as closely intertwined
issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense
practical question of whether there is probable cause to
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believe that contraband or evidence is located in a
particular place." Gates, 464 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct at
2328; see \State v.1Hansen, 732 P.2d [127,] 130 (Utah
1987); Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1306.
(Footnote omitted.)
This Court emphasized in Droneburq the continuing need
for the officer to include specific facts in a search warrant
affidavit so that a neutral magistrate can adequately assess
whether probable cause exists:
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant
is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit
must contain specific facts sufficient to support a
determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause
exists." The action of the magistrate, however, must not
be "a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others."
Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a
"rubber stamp" for police, abandoning the neutral and
detached role which is "a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law
enforcement officer."
Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1304 (citations omitted).
In assessing whether probable cause exists where an
affidavit does not contain specific facts regarding the veracity,
reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant, courts look to
the specificity and quantity of details supplied by the informant,
along with the corroboration of such information by police officers
or the obtainment of additional information by police officers.
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983).

In Droneburq, this Court

held that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable
cause.

This Court pointed out that "[n]either the credibility of

the informant nor the reliability of the information was ever
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established."

Id. at 1306.

In addition, the

"quantity of

information" was insufficient to establish probable cause.
In Bailey, the Supreme Court pointed out that although
the informant's tip in Gates came from an anonymous letter, the
affidavit was upheld because the informant supplied details as to
the drug dealers' mode of operation, and the officer corroborated
the information "in great detail" before obtaining a warrant.

675

P.2d at 1206. The affidavit in Bailey indicated that the informant
had "previously given truthful information to the police concerning
the existence of contraband" and "the reliability of the informant
was 'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his
personal observation.'"

Id. at 1206.

Utah recognizes that "information from citizen informants
who stand to gain nothing from providing information to the police
is not viewed with the same rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of
a regular police informant."

Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206 (citing

State v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972).

"Veracity is

generally assumed when the information comes from an 'average
citizen who is in a position to supply information by virtue of
having been a crime victim or witness.'" State v. Harris, 671 P.2d
175 (Utah 1983) (quoting 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.3 (1978)).
See also State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992);
Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 57-8 (Utah
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
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As a result of the material omissions by Officer Bassi,
the affidavit

must

be examined

for probable

cause with the

following statements added:
1.
2.
conviction.

CI is on probation; and
CI has at least one prior drug-related

These facts shed considerable doubt on the veracity and reliability
of CI's statements.
The affidavit

asserts that the CI's information is

reliable because (1) CI was not offered or paid anything for the
information, and (2) CI made a statement against penal interest (CI
had purchased narcotics).

Aff. page three.

Given CI's status as a probationer, CI/s assertions are
less reliable than an average citizen's report. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether CI would proffer the information indicated in
the affidavit without first receiving some promise from the police.
Officer Bassi swore that the CI indicated that the CI had purchased
heroin at the premises within the previous three days, and yet was
promised nothing in exchange for this information.
three.

Aff. page

Since CI faces criminal charges as a result of his

admission, serious questions are raised as to CI's motive for
revealing this information.

Because the officer did not reveal

this information to the magistrate, the magistrate was prevented
from

addressing

these

serious

questions.

Under

these

circumstances, the search warrant does not indicate that the CI is
sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause.
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Absent the information provided by CI, the affidavit
stands on the information provided by Van Katwyk's probationer.
The affidavit states:
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer
Harvey Van Katwyk who told your affiant the following.
Van Katwyk had been told by one of VanKatwyk's
probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who was reportedly a
Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell were all
three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed
premises. Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that
the observations of the probationer were first hand.
Further the most recent observation was within the last
2 weeks.
The probationer observed Joe Dowell using
heroin and cocaine. Further the probationer observed
Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin and cocaine
from the listed premises.
Aff. page two.
This probationer's information was thought to be reliable
because

(1)

he

information, and

was

not

offered

or

paid

anything

for

the

(2) he was concerned about a friend who was

purchasing and using heroin at the premises. Aff page two.

It is

important to note that Bassi revealed that information obtained
through

Officer Van Katwyk was obtained

from

a probationer.

However, Officer Bassi only disclosed an informant's status as a
probationer where it bolstered the credibility of the affidavit.
This information helps explain why Mr. Bassi was relying on double
hearsay

information

obtained

by

Mr.

Van

Katwyk

from

his

probationer.
Neither Van Katwyk's probationer's statements nor CI's
statements are buttressed by any detail with which the facts in the
affidavit are described. Cf. Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206, State v.
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), State v. Romero. 660
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P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983).
conclusory

statements.

informants'

statements

Affidavits should contain more than

Droneburg,
are

not

781

P. 2d

buttressed

at

1305.

The

by

independent

verification or corroboration, beyond the simple facts that Vera
Mason (who lived at the premises) and Joe Dowell were seen at the
premises by Officer Bassi.

Cf. Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102;

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 241, 103 S.Ct 2317, 2333, 76
L.Ed.2d 527, 550, reh'cr denied. 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77
L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983).

Surely the officers could have at least

verified that Jack Sirstins was in fact a federal fugitive and that
Mason in fact had a prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related
offenses. Indeed, investigation into the circumstances of Mason's
alleged (but unsubstantiated) prior arrest might have revealed some
information to support issuance of a no-knock warrant.
Van Katwyk#s probationer's information suffers from lack
of

specificity

concerning

information concerning
persons involved.

the

alleged

drug

sales,

including

frequency, amounts involved, and other

Besides lack of specificity, the information

further suffers from lack of recency. The most recent observation
was two weeks old. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States. 282
U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (warrants are not to
issue on the basis of "loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact");
Orr v. State. 382 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1980) (reliable CI's
claim that "within the past ten days" he had received information
of another's drug possession was insufficient because CI did not
state when drugs were actually possessed). The affidavit indicates
33

that the most recent observation was within the last two weeks, but
does not indicate that the observation was anything more than that
Sirstins, Mason, and Dowel1 were at the premises.
While a certain amount of discretion is given to the
magistrate to construe ambiguity in search warrant affidavits,
requiring the magistrate to construe all ambiguities regarding
timing in favor of recency would unduly extend such discretion.
"It is one thing to expect the magistrate to give a
commonsense reading to the facts set forth and to draw
inferences from them.
It is quite another thing to
expect the magistrate to reach for external facts and to
build inference upon inference in order to create a
reasonable basis for his belief that a crime is presently
being committed."
2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(b) at 89 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Simmons, 301 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1973)). Information in the affidavit
is too stale to support a finding of probable cause.
Under the totality of the circumstances with the omitted
information added, the affidavit fails to support a finding of
probable cause.
The good faith exception of Leon is not applicable here.
See discussion in §I.B.f supra at 19.

POINT III. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
A.

THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI TEST SHOULD
APPLY IN ASSESSING PROBABLE CAUSE
UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.

Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of whether the Acruilar-Spinelli test should be applicable
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under the Utah constitution. The two-pronged Aauilar-Spinelli test
requires that the affidavit in support of a search warrant set
forth:
(1)

the basis of the informant's knowledge;

and
(2) facts establishing the credibility of the
informant or the reliability of the information,
Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli v. United States. 393
U.S. at 413; Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1205.
Various reasons exist for embracing the Acruilar-Spinelli
test under the Utah constitution rather than the more nebulous
"totality of the circumstances" test.
Requiring officers to set forth in the affidavit the
underlying facts and circumstances enhances the role of the neutral
and detached magistrate.

See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322

(Alaska 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984);
Gates, 462 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(the magistrate
must "make the proper independent judgment about the persuasiveness
of the facts relied upon by the officer.").
The two-pronged test provides a more practical, workable
test than the more nebulous totality of the circumstances test,
thereby providing greater assurance that Article I, section 14 will
not be violated.

As the court pointed out in Jones, 706 P.2d at

322, the Acruilar-Spinelli test:
has not reduced probable cause to a neat, artificial set
of legal rules. "Rather, the two-pronged test provided
a structure for probable cause inquiries, and if not
rigidly applied, allowed sufficient room for assessment
of the unique facts of the particular case."
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Id. (citing LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 at p. 136 (1984
Supp.).
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent:
Acruilar and Spinelli require the police to provide
magistrates with certain crucial information. They also
provide structure for magistrates' probable cause
inquiries. In so doing, Aauilar and Spinelli preserve
the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of
probable
cause
determinations,
and
advance
the
substantive value of precluding findings of probable
cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything less
than information from an honest or credible person who
has acquired his information in a reliable way.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 287, 103 S.Ct. at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580.
Various state courts have adopted the Aauilar-Spinelli
test

for

analyzing

constitution.

search

warrants

under

their

state's

State v. Jones. 706 P.2d at 317 (Alaska); State v.

Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash.); People v. Johnson. 488 N.E.2d 439
(N.Y. Ct.App. 1985). See generally Note, United States v. Leon and
Illinois v. Gates; A Call for State Courts to Develop State
Constitutional Law, 1987 U.111.L.Rev. 311 (1987); Ryan, Is the Two
Prong Test of Aguilar-Spinelli Alive and Well in California?. 13
W.St.U.L.Rev. 45 (1985).
Given the unique circumstances under which the Utah
constitution was enacted, the preference for warrants under the
Utah constitution (see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah
1990)), and the more practical and workable guidelines of the
Aguilar-Spinelli

test, this Court

should

apply that

test in

assessing search warrants under Article I, section 14 of the Utah
constitution.
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B.

AS A RESULT OF MATERIAL OMISSIONS
AND FAILURE TO SATISFY THE AGUILARSPINELLI TEST, THE SEARCH WARRANT IS
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

As outlined in § II.A., supra at 23, when reviewing an
affidavit that suffers from material omissions the Court must
assess the affidavit with the omitted information inserted.
With the omitted

information

inserted,

the

affidavit

fails to satisfy the Acruilar-Spinelli test.
The
Katwyk's

affidavit

probationer

indicates

was

obtained

that
by

information

first

hand

from

Van

observation.

However, the reliability of this information is not evident on the
face of the affidavit.

It indicates that the observations were

alleged to be first hand, the probationer was not promised nor paid
anything for the information, and the probationer was concerned
about the welfare of a friend who was purchasing and using heroin
at the named premises.

Aff. page two.

The affidavit does not

indicate:
(1) that this informant has been used before
and been found to be reliable;
(2) that the reliability of the information
from the informant is boosted by the particularity with
which details are described; or
(3) that the police have corroborated any
details (e.g., that the probationer actually has a friend
buying heroin at the premises, that heroin and cocaine
are actually being used at the premises) through
independent investigation (except for the details that
Vera Mason is occasionally at her home and that Joe
Dowell occasionally is there with her).
Further, the police did not attempt a controlled buy.

Under the

circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that the probationer's
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story

is anything

but

a complete

fabrication

to please his

probation officer.
Information from the CI is stated to be based on direct
observation.

The affidavit again recites that this CI was not

promised nor paid anything for the information, and it further
recites that CI had purchased heroin at the premises within the
last three days.
No particular detail that would bolster the reliability
of the information is contained in the affidavit.

Although the

affidavit states that "when agents from AP & P conduct home visits
at the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from
a side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of
narcotics," (aff. page two) the police failed to verify that AP &
P actually conducts home visits at the premises.

Even so, flight

in the abstract is not sufficient to establish probable cause to
arrest.

State v. Elliott, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1981).
The simplest police work could have corroborated (or

refuted) basic details of CI's story.
affidavit is largely conclusory.

The information in the

See Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1305.

As previously indicated it is questionable whether a probationer
would voluntary proffer that he had purchased heroin without
receiving some promise in return.

Under these circumstances, the

affidavit does not provide a substantial basis to support a finding
of probable cause.
No Leon-type good faith exception should exist under the
Utah constitution.

Even if it exists, it would not be applicable
38

under the facts of this case.

See discussion in §I.B., supra at

19.

POINT IV. THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO
JUSTIFY ARREST OF MR. LEE.
If this Court should uphold the validity of the search
made pursuant to the search warrant, the police nevertheless had no
probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee. The subsequent search of Mr. Lee
pursuant to his arrest was therefore improper and the fruits of
that search should be suppressed.
U.S. 471# 484, 83 S.Ct. 407,

Wong Sun v. United States, 371

, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 453 (1963).

Reasonable cause for arrest without a warrant was been
defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
"The determination should be made on an objective
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer,
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom,
a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the
offense."
State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v.
Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Utah 1972).

In the instant case,

there was no sufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee.
Mr. Lee was arrested for possession of narcotics.
110:10-12.

The evidence in this case fails to show that Mr. Lee

was in possession of narcotics.
Lee.

R.

R. 110:22-24.

bedroom of Vera Mason.

No narcotics were found on Mr.

The narcotics were found on a bed in the
R. 93:8-12; 109:6-13.

Mr. Robert Kersey

was found by the bed with one hand touching the bed. R. 106:13-25.
Mr. Kersey had fresh "track markings" on his arm. R. 107:1-7. No
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personal belongings of Mr. Lee were found in the bedroom or on the
bed.

R. 109:20-22.
The fact that Mr. Lee emerged from the room containing

the narcotics is not determinative:
[P]ersons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit
drugs and who might even have access to them, but who
have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be
convicted of possession of a controlled substance.
Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession
where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that
knowledge and ability.
To find that a defendant had constructive
possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary
to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the
accused and the drug to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drug.
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the
drugs are found, although important factors, are not
alone sufficient to establish constructive possession,
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. Some other
factors which might combine to show a sufficient nexus
between the accused and the drug are:
incriminating
statements made by the accused; incriminating behavior of
the accused; presence of drugs in a specific area over
which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer
containing the accused's clothing or other personal
effects; [and] presence of drug paraphernalia among the
accused's personal effects or in a place over which the
accused has special control.
Id. (cites omitted).

None of the factors outlined in Fox is

applicable to Mr. Lee. He made no incriminating statements, had no
incriminating behavior, the drugs were not found in a specific area
over which Mr. Lee had control, and Mr. Lee had no special control
of any area of the premises or personal effects on the premises.
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), this
Court reversed a conviction for possession of cocaine.
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Defendant

was the driver and owner of a vehicle in which cocaine was found in
the crack of the back seat.

Two other individuals were in the

vehicle at the time it was stopped. This Court held that there was
no sufficient nexus between the defendant and the cocaine. In the
present case, there was no sufficient nexus between Mr. Lee and the
heroin found in Vera Mason's bedroom.
There was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee.

Absent

probable cause, all evidence seized from Mr. Lee pursuant to the
subsequent search at the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 115:18-116:2)
should be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial judge's order denying his motion to suppress.

The evidence

obtained in the search of the premises should be suppressed.
Evidence seized from the search of Mr. Lee should be suppressed as
fruit of the poisonous tree.

SUBMITTED this <-'

day of December, 1992.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the «tate of Utah.
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Agent
Brad Bassi, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That
3/21/40,

(X) on the persons off Verra Mason, A female black adult, DOB,

( ) the vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta Street, (240
East) , the premises is on west side of the road, the apartment is on the
southern most half of the four plex, #1, to include all containers, rooms,
attics, and basements found therein.
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now being possesr.ed or concealed certain property or evidence described
is:

SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
rhich property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct*
ou are therefore commanded:
(X) in the day time
( ) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown)
(x) to execute without notice of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.)

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR ROCK FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
AND CUT MATERIAL.
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in
your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

day of

A!<=

,1991.

JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR^
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt take

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That
(X) on the persons of, Vera Mason, A female black adult,
DOB, 3/21/40.
( ) the vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta
Street, (240 East), the premises is on west side of the road, the
apartment is on the southern most half of the four plex, #1, to
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein.
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now certain property of evidence described as:
and that said property or evidence:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
[ ) consists of ai\ iteia or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance,
possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute.

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR RQCK FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
AND CUT MATERIAL.
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Agent Brad Bassi, is employed by the State of
Utah, Corrections Department, as a Parole Officer, assigned to
Region Three, ISP. Your affiant has been a sworn peace officer in
Utah for over 3 years. Your affiant has been involved in law
enforcement employment for over 17 years in Utah.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses.
Your affiant is investigating an illicit heroin, cocaine, and
usage case, being conducted at the named premises, by the name
persons on this affidavit/warrant.
Your affiant has received
information from a two separate sources of information.
Your
affiant* (has been- told by both sources of information that the
person)*/listed aw" using and selling cocaine and heroin at the
listed premises.
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer Harvey Van
Katwyk who told your affiant the following. Van Katwyk had been
told by one of VanKatwyk's probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who
was reportedly a Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell, were
all three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed
premises.
Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that the
observations of the probationer were first hand. Further the most
recent observation was within the last 2 weeks. The probationer
observed Joe Dowell using heroin and cocaine.
Further the
probationer observed Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin
and cocaine from the listed premises.
VanKatwyk believes the information provided by the probationer
is truthful and accurate for the following reasons. The
observations were first hand. The probationer has not promised nor
paid anything for the information. Further the probationer is
concerned for the welfare of a friend that has been purchasing and
using heroin at the named premises.
Your affiant has interviewed a separate source of information
herein after referred to as CI.
Your affiant was told the
following. CI has been inside the named premises and observed Vera
Mason and Joseph Dowell's are selling cocaine and heroin at the
named premises. Further the CI stated that the CI has observed
Joseph Dowell's using narcotics at the named premises. Further the
CI has stated that when agents from AP & P conduct home visits at
the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from a
side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of
narcotics.

PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Your affiant was told by the CI that the most recent
observation of narcotics sales and usage at the named premises was
on December 21st, 1991. Further your affiant was told that Vera
Mason and Joseph Dowell were selling " a large quantity of
narcotics", from the named premises. CI has told your affiant that
this illicit operation is ongoing, that Vera Mason has been selling
narcotics out of the premises for a long period of time, and
further that Joe Dowell has been assisting Vera Mason in the
illicit operation for approximately 1 1/2 months.
Your affiant believes that the information from the CI is
accurate and truthful for the following reasons. Your affiant has
si{/
not promised nor paid the CI anything for the information provided. / Px
Further CI has made statements against CI's own penal interest. .
^_
Your affiant is the supervising parole officer for Joseph
I^J
Dowell. Your affiant has reviewed Dowell's file and Dowell shows Wo^
prior arrest for bank robbery, (armed), burglary, and at least 4 aj^jfi^
prior arrest for distribution of a controlled substance. Dowell is
currently on parole to the State of Utah for distribution of a
controlled substance, heroin and cocaine.
Further your affiant would like to advise the courts that
Dowell has only been out of prison for approximately 2 months.
Your affiant knows from experience and training, as a parole
officer, that parolee's often, return to their criminal habits and
criminal peer groups.
Your affiant has been told by two separate sources that Dowell
is selling and using cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your
affiant has been told that Vera Mason is also using and selling
cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your affiant has been to
the named premises and have observed both individuals at the named
premises. Further your affiant is aware that Vera Mason has a long
history of substance abuse and sales.
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing and there
will be additional amounts of heroin and cocaine at the named
premises. Your affiant has been told that the operation has been
ongoing for several months. Your affiant has been told that the CI
has made purchases of heroin from the named premises within the
last 3 days.
Further your affiant believes that the named premises should
be searched for drug paraphernalia and packaging material. Your
affiant believes that these items will be present for the following
reasons. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these
items are needed to ingest cocaine and heroin and to weigh out
additional amounts for resale. Your affiant has been told by two
sources that they have observed Dowell and Mason use narcotics.

PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this warrant. Your
affiant has reviewed the criminal history of DOWELL and he has a
prior armed robbery. Further your affiant has been told that MASON
has prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses.
Your affiant also knows from training and experience that the
items sought pursuant to this search warrant are easily destroyed,
hidden or altered. Further your affiant fears any delay in the this
service of the search warrant will allow additional quantities of
heroin and cocaine to be sold.
Your affiant considers the information received from the
confidential informant reliable because:
see body of affidavit
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
see body of affidavit

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a SEARCH WARRANT be issued
for 'the seizure of said itenu,:
(X) in the day time.
( ) at any time during day or night because there is
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it
being concealedf destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good
reasons, to wit:

It is further requested that (if appropriate )±he officer
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of
the officers authority or purpose because:
(x) physical harm may result to any person if no Li* ,*
were given, or
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed off, or secreted.
The*danger is believed to exist becauses

Brad Bassi
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

s*4

day of AJ)^^

19?/ .

In theJgfV <f>rrHTCourt
In and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah

